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In recent years, there has been increasing interest in the effects of the
government debt on the economy. The basic idea on this issue is commonly
attributed to the debate on the 'Ricardian equivalence hj^Dothesis', which
states that whether a given level of government purchases is tax financed or
bond financed is irrelevant to the effects on the economy. The
conventional view (Blinder and Solow, 1973, Feldstein, 1982) assumes that
the government debt issue leads to an increase in perceived household wealth
(i.e., wealth effect) and argues that an increase in public debt results in
an increase in desired consumption relative to saving, hence an increase in
real interest rates. But Barro (1974) and others^ argue that, because the
future tax liabilities implicit in debt financing are foreseen by rational
economic agents and private opportunities exist for intergenerational
transfers and bequests, there is no wealth effect of the government debt.
Therefore, changes in the relative amounts of tax and debt finance for a
given amount of public expenditure would have no effect on aggregate demand
(or consumption) and interest rates.
Because there have been various theoretical explanations of this issue,
the resolution of the debate has become essentially an empirical matter.
This has spawned a number of papers that seek to provide required empirical
studies. These include Kochin (1974), Tanner (1S79), Feldstein (1982),
Plosser (1982), Kormendi (1983), Aschauer (1985), and Evans (1985, 1987).
This paper attempts to improve upon previous studies on empirical testing
of the Ricardian equivalence hj'pothesis in three points.
First, the Ricardian equivalence hj'pothesis is about the effects of a
substitution of deot for taxes, for a given level of government
expenditures, both on consumption expenditures and on interest rates.
Plosser (1982) and r.vans (1985, 1987) have studied the effects of the
government deficit on interest rates, ignoring its effects on consumption,
1
whereas others (Kochin, 1974, Tanner, 1979, Feldstein, 1982, Kormendi, 1983,
and Aschauer, 1985) have investigated the effects on private consumption,
treating interest rates as constant. The tendency to focus on only one
factor or the other may be due to the difficulty of specifying a consumption
model with stochastic (i.e., time-varying) interest rates that provides a
2
closed form solution. This paper examines the effects of the government
debt on both private consumption and interest rates in a nonlinear-quadratic
equilibrium framework with implications that include the Ricardian
equivalence hypothesis to allow for time-varying interest rates. Instead
of the conventional analysis, this paper employs an idea of asset pricing to
determine the nature of the hypothesis in a way that leads to statistical
representations with testable hypotheses.
in general, closed-form solutions for the equilibrium time paths of the
variables for the nonlinear-quadratic framework c^ be obtained only after
imposing additional assumptions on the stochastic properties of the relevant
variables. To obtain an empirically tractable, closed-form characteri
zation of the restrictions from the model, a constant relative risk aversion
(GRRA) preference and the jointly covariance-stationary lognormal
distribution of the relevant variables are assumed, following Hansen and
Singleton (1383) and Bean (1385). The model is summarized by the restric
tions on the coefficients of a vector autoregressive (VAR) representation of
the relevant variables. The implied restrictions from the model are tested
by using postwar data.
Second, whether there has been any empirical evidence of the regime
change between a Ricardian regime and a non-Ricardian regime has become a
more relevant issue these days in view of rapidly increasing government
budget deficits. Various theoretical models have been suggested to
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analyze a possible change in the regime. A sample split test .is
performed, adding recent data to the model. The sample period 1947
through 1979 was tested first, and the restriction of the model that
reflects the Ricardian equivalence hypothesis is not rejected for this
period-. This also implies that the model mimics the real data fairly well,
even with the restrictions mentioned above. But when the sample period is
extended to include the Reagan administration period up to 1987,1 (i.e.,
1947 through 1987,1), the model seems to be rejected.
Third, when the model is rejected, the cause of the rejection needs to be
further investigated through more detailed data analysis. This is
particularly important because rejection of tlie model can not automatically
be interpreted as rejection of the equivalence h>-pothesis, due to the
complex nature of the model and the restriction. To help understand
possible causes of the rejection and possible differences in dynamic
interactions among the variables of interest between the two sample periods,
a VAR analysis of the data is performed. This is naturally derived from
the covariance-stationary assumption of the variables, and provides some
basis for the comparison of the outcome with previous studies. This exer
cise is partly intended to illustrate a close link between a non-quadratic
djTiaiTiic framework and a VAR representation of the relevant variables under
the assumptions mentioned as well as to test the implications of the
Ricardian equivalence hj^xjthesis with time-varying interest rates.
"Hie data anal>"sis based on a VAR representation implies that, faced with
ever-increasir»g goverruDent deficits and debt, the public may have begun to
adjust their consumption behavior accordingly. But, more importantly, the
rejection of the model is mainly due to the change in the behavior of real
interest rates - -real interest rates move downward even further in response
to tne shocks in government debt- -and government debt does not seem to have
any significant, explanatory power for real interest rates and consumption,
which still remain compatible with the Ricardian equivalence hypothesis.
Therefore, the rejection of the model for recent years may not necessarily
imply rejection of-the equivalence hypothesis and the equivalence hj^jbthesis
remains a plausible approximation of the real data.
This paper is organized as follows. In section I, a nonlinear-quadratic
equilibrium model with implications consistent with the Ricardian
equivalence hypothesis is described. In section II, empirically testable
restrictions are derived from the model and are tested for each sample
period. An additional time series evidence based on a VAR analysis is
presented and discussed in section III. Summary and concluding remarks are>
contained in section IV.
I. Formulation of the Hypothesis
As a theoretical foundation of the equivalence hj-pothesis, this paper
relies on the following discrete time intertemporal optimization model.
The model allows for government expenditure to enter consumer's utility
function and to be a substitute for private consumption and for time varj'ing
interest rates. Consider a representative consumer who faces the
following optimization problem, whose utility function is of the CI2RA tj^ps:
C9
(1) max E. I gJ )*^ / t » 0<^<1, 0<^<1, t<1 ,
t=0
subject to
^/T aDP / a _T.
t *t*
(2) - ^ \-i • Pt'-t - °
Government budget constraint is given as
(3) °t ~ =V^t " Vl '
(4)
where ^ = a discount factor
= aggregate real per capita consumption in period t
= government expenditure in period t
= lump sum tax in period t
= one-period government-issued (nominal) debt at t
= nominal gross interest rate at t
= price level at t
= income (or output) in period t
= the mathematical expectation conditional on the information
available to agents at time t, 0 . Hence, E (x) = E(x|n. ).
w w U
Equation (2) states that each consumer has the opportunity in t of
purchasing government bonds at a discounted price of l/I. and each bond is
redeemed in t+1 for one unit of money. Equation (3) is the government's
budget constraint, which states that the government finances its
expenditures by a stream of lump sum taxes and by issuing one-period debt
The first order conditions for this problem would be
(sT (1-n
where is a Lagrangian multiplier. Combining these two equations,
(7) 1/^ =
=- '
where ~ ^t.+l^^t' ^t+1 variables in the bracket [.1.
An important perspective on the dj-namic nature of the model in relation
to the Ricardian equivalence hypothesis is provided by the following
pbser\'ations. A repeated forward substitution for B in the consumer's
budget constraint (2) yields
- B-1 V=o -
t
where I. = n . I. and assuming I - = 1, and (B./I. 0 as t->co.
J=-l -it J;t
This implies the present discounted value of private consumption e>:penditure
is the sum of current government bond holdings and the present discounted
value of disposable income. Similarly, (3) yields
which states that the current government debt that matures at time 0 is
supported by the present discounted value of government's budget surpluses.
By substituting (9) into (8),
which implies that the present discounted value of consumption plus the
present discounted value of government expenditure will be equal to the
present discounted value of income because income (or output) is spent
, either_by the_consumer_or by the.government. _ _
Maximization of the consumer's objective function (1) subject to the
present value form of integrated budget constraint (10) yields the same
first order condition ,(7). This implies that the optimizing consumer
recognizes that current government debt will be financed by the future
government budget surpluses. In this economj', at an equilibrium,
C = y. - .
O L. U
This implies that given {y. } and {G^} paths, {C. ) is not affected by gover-
^ L.
nment's financing decision between tax and debt. In addition, given {C^]
. ^
{G^l paths, equation (7) implies that real interest rates, (l4.Al^.i)f
are not affected by the government's financing decision either. Therefore,
in this economy, the following Ricardian equivalence hypothesis holds: the
equilibrium consumption and real interest rates depend only on the {y ) and
{G^} paths. The government's financing decision on the time path of taxes
and government bond issues has no effect on equilibrium consumption and real
interest rates. This is because, as shown in equations (9) and (10),
current government bonds are covered by future government budget surpluses,
and the economic agents recognize this and they do not treat the current
government bonds as net wealth. Therefore, their consumption behavior is
not affected by the issue of government debt for given {Y. , G } paths (see
W O
Sargent, 1987, p. 116).
II. A Test of the Hypothesis
A. Testable Restrictions
The empirical approach of this paper is to characterize the hj'pothesis
using the restrictions (7) which the theoretical intertemporal model places
on .the dat?.. This section .SLnalyzes...the..firstrorder conditions, (or .Euler.
conditions) of an optimizing economic agent whose behavior is consistent
with the Ricardian equivalence hypothesis. The nonlinear restriction (7)
is linearized using additional distributional assumptions because -the linear
model is more easily tractable ajid is subject to time-series econometric
analj-ses.
Now let
= In G. - In - g^^_^
vb^ = In - In - = b^ - b^ ,
L. U-1 t t-1
(11) = In - In and
^t+1 " ^ \+l '
vdiere v = 1-L is the lag difference operater, with L denoting the lag
operater (i.e., ~ ^t 1^assume that the stochastic process -
[^Ct» vg^, ^t^'' ^ covariance stationary, indeterministic
process where ' denotes transpose. Then has a moving average
representation by the Wold theorem
(12) = D(L) + do .
where D(L) is a 4x4 infinite order matrix polynomial in the lag operator L
m
(i.e., D(L) = [ D. .(L) ] = [r D. .(s) L®] for i,j = 1,2,3,4.),
s=0
with D(0) = I, and d^ is a 4 dimensional vector of constants,
^2^ ~ \ ~ ' \-2 ^ Proj. denoting the linear least
squares projection of Y. on a closed linear space spanned by [Y - , Y
... ].
By construction, is serially uncorrelated. Further, we assume
for t=l,2, ..., T, is distributed as Jointly normal. From this
assumption it follows that u^^ is independently normally distributed and
.-that—Y^--is---a stationary, Gaussian process.-- - Tnis—implies - that the
distribution of , conditional on the information set {0, ) = {Y , for s
1«, t-s
= 0,1,2,...) is normal, with a mean (= ^ linear
function, of past observations on Y^ and a constant conditional covariance.
From this assumption,
^:t ^t+i = ^ '•
From {7) and (11),
(14) E In = (T-l-lr-n .
By taking expectations of both sides of (7) conditional on 0^^ and noting
that (7) becomes
(15) 1/^ = .
I/et j ~ '^t 1" substituting (13) into (15) and taking the
natural logarithms of both sides of (15), (15) becomes
2
- In ^ = In + o- /2, or
= - In ^ - ff^/2
Define,
"t - ~ ^It-l^t " ^t ^t-1 •
By substituting (14) for z ,
= (y - 1 - tO vc^ + Ti Vg^ +
(16) = vc^ + ^2 vg^ + ,
2 *where a^ = y - 1 - /2» and u^ = 0.
Equation (16) summarizes the restrictions among the consumption,
government expenditures, and interest rates implied by the first order
condition (7) of the model. Because we are interested in analyzing the
effects of the government debt on private consumption and interest rates, it
is assumed that the government debt 7b^ enters the system through the
auxiliary equations for the prediction of government expenditure,
consumption, and interest rate (i.e., E^^ ^ ^t '^^
The stationary, Gaussian process, [^c., Tg^, vb,, r.]* = Y., is assumed
u u t t t
0
to have the following unrestricted vector autoregressive representation:
(17) Y. = C(L) + Cq + Uj. .
where C(L) is a 4 x 4 dimensional matrix with elements that are finite mth-
order polynomials in the lag operator L,
m(i.e., C(L) = [ C. .(L) ] = [ X C. .(s) L® ^ ] for i,j = 1,2,3,4. ),
s=l ^
and Cq = [ C^Q, C^q, C^q ]' is a vector of constants, and
^It " ^ ^llt' "l2t' ^13t' "l4t ~ \ ~ ^ s=l,2, ,m)
is a sequence of mean 7-ero, independently, jointly normally distributed
random vectors. The zeros of det[I - C(z)z] are assumed to be outside the
unit circle becauise of stationarity of the process.
Equation (16) implies the following set of restrictions across the VAR
coefficients in (17):
a^Ci^{s) + a2C2j(s) + C4i(s) = 0
+ C42(b) = 0
+ V23'^' + C43(s) = 0
a^Cj4(s) + a-^Cj^ts) + 044(3) = 0
^1^10 ^2'^ 20 ^40 + In ^ + cr^/2 = 0
for s=l,2,,.,m, and a^, are defined as before. These restrictions
reflect implications of the model including Ricardian equivalence hj'pothesis
and describe how the growth in past government debt affects real interest
rates and the growth in consumption. Therfore, a finding that these
restrictions are. not rejected, by the data .implies... that, the .model of. which
implications include the equivalence hypothesis is a plausible description
of the real data.
On the other hand, equation (16) yields the following restricted VAR
system:
18 •'•0 \ + u,. or
B^(L) Y._^ +Aq-1 Bq + u,, .
where
10
=^3' ° with Ig a 3x3 identity matrix, 0 = [0, 0, 0]', 3x1,
and a = [a^, a^. 0], 1x3, Bg =[ B^q, Bg^, -Ir^S - <r^/2
The matrix lag polynomial B^(L) is given in partitioned form by
B^(L) =
•Bi.(L)^
0 IJ
m
with [ B. .(L) ] = [ I B. .(S) ] for i =l,2,3,
s=l
j=l,2,3,4, and 0 is a 1x4 zero (row) vector, and
*
= [ ^21t' ^22t' ^23t' ^t ^* That is, the fourth row of the equation
(18) is given by a^ vc^ + vg^ ^ 1
X
W =0.
w
B. A Test of the Hj'pothesis
Because u^^ for t=l,2,....,T, in (17) is independently normally distri
buted, the likelihood function of a sample of u^^ for t = 1,2,...,T is given
by
T
(19) L(e^|{Uj^)) = exp [(-l/2)( I '
where = [C^..(L).,-.Cjj-,-V^,,-L=l.2,-... ,m, i,j = 1,2,3,4]- and -• -
= E u^^u^^'. Minimizing (19) subject to (17) yields unconstrained
estimates of the coefficients 9^. Under the restriction (IS), the likeli
hood function (19) becomes a function of = [a, B. .(L), B«, V^,
2 ij •0 2'
L=l,2,..,m, i,J =1,2,3,4], where =EiJ2t"2t'' ^ Wilson (1S73). and
Bard (1374) have noted, maximum likelihood estimates with an unknown
general (non—diagonal) covariance matrix V. for i=l,2 are obtained by
minimizing with respect to the coefficients the criterion
1(T/2) In |V 1 r (T/2) In det(T'-^ I u.^ u.J) for i = 1, 2 ,
t=i
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where the u.. 's are the estimated vectors of residuals. Let L be the
It u
value of likelihood function at its unconstrained maximum while L is the
r
value of likelihood function under the restriction (18). Then, under the
null hypothesis that the restriction (16) (or (18)) is correct,
-2 In (L^/L^) = -2 (-T/2) In (IV |^/IV |^) =T (In |V^I - In IV |^)
2
is SLsymptotically distributed as X (q), where q is the number of
restrictions imposed, and where V and V are the constrained and
r u
unconstrained estimates of V, respectively (see Wilson, 1973). Because
the unconstrained version of the system in (17) has 4(l+4m) regressors, and
the number of free parameters in the system is equal to 3+3(l+4m), the
likelihood ratio statistic -2 ln(L^/L^) is distributed in large samples as
2
X (q) random variable with q = 4(l+4m)-3-3(l+4m) = 4m-2. Thus, q = 2
when m = 1, q = 6 when m = 2.
The empirical procedure is conducted by full information maxijnum
likelihood (FIML) estimation to obtain |V^I and |V |^ . The actual
estimation was carried out by using the GAUSS computer package
(specifically, MAXMUM program), which provides various algorithms for
computing numerical gradients and hessian matrices to minimize the value of
I'^ 'l Estimations and the tests were obtained by using quarterly data
for two time periods: 1947,1 through 1979,IV and 1947,1 through 1S87,I.
The results are reported in Tables 1 and 2. During 1980 - 1987,
government deficits and debts have increased sigr..:ficantly as a result of a
fiscal revolution created by the Reagan administration that includes a
program of tax cuts.
Consumption expenditure (C^) is measured, following the usual practice of
excluding durables from measured consumption, by per capita personal
12
Table 1.1 FIML ESTIMATION OF EQUATIONS
1947:111 to. 1979:IV
(17) and (18) with ra=l.
// j=0 1 2 3 4
Unconstrained model (Equation (17))
.0042
(.0011)
.1314
(.0888)
-.0375
(.0225)
.0076
(.0234)
.0046
(.0317)
^2j .0081
(.0034)
-.0422
(.2643)
.5208
(.0658)
-.0824
(.0595)
-.2252
(.0942)
-.0064
(.0044)
-.2295
(.3435)
-.1295
(.0858)
.1803
(.0905)
.1708
(.1224)
CAj .0025
(.0015)
.0343
(.1202)
.0064
(.0304)
-.0481
(.0317)
.9141
(.0429)
Constrained model (Equation (.18))
.0035
(.0011)
.0054
(.0904)
-.0280
(.0228)
.0020
(.0238)
.0503
(.0322)
.0072
(.0033)
-.0508
(.2644)
.5236
(.0668)
-.0929
(.0697)
-.1908
(.0942)
^3j -.0071
(.0044)
-.2378
(.3435)
-.1245
(.0858)
.1723
(.0905)
.1922
(.1224)
V = -
(
.0802
.0156)
a, = -21.
(1.
8101
9795)
a2 ~ ~•98o7
(.4905)
l^u' = 10 X-\36l- — -
.
IV,1 = 10~-^ X .374
Likelihood ratio test statistic = 129 x In C.37A/.351) = 4.5537
a .Marginal significance level = .1021
Source: Citibank econoitic data base
Notes: Estimated standard errors in parentheses.
^ -Marginal significance level is defined as ?rob [X s x] under the null
r.ypo.nesj.s, vnere X is a cm-scuare distributed random variable and x
IS the test statistic.
12.1
Table 1.2 FIML ESTIMATION OF EQUATIONS
1947:111 to 1987:1
(17) and (18) with m=l.
j=0 1 2 3 4
Unconstrained model (Equation (17))
Ci. .0052
(.0010)
.1087
(,0803)
-.0323
(.0216)
.0284
(.0213)
-.0260
(.0196)
C2- .0042
•' (.0029)
.0350
(.2366)
.6007
(.0636)
-.0880
(.0628)
-.0552
(.0577)
C3. -.0084
(.0037)
-.1567
(.2998)
-.0913
(.0806)
.2319
(.0795)
.2758
(.0731)
C4. .0032
(.0019)
.1342
(.1513)
-.0096
(.0407)
-.0139
(.0401)
.9080
(.0369)
Constrained model (Equation (18))
.0031
(.0010)
.0074
(.0821)
-.0147
(.0220)
.0020
(.0217)
.0401
(.0200)
B2,- .0038
(.0029)
.0145
(.2367)
.6040
(.0636)
-.0928
(.0628)
-.0429
(.0577)
B3. -.0095
(.0037)
-.2038
(.3001)
-.0817
(.0807)
,2174
(.0796)
.3114
(.0732)
--- iV, I- =
\z
u == -.057A
(.01A9)
10 .758"
IV.I = 10"'^ X .835
Likelinood rsuio test statistic = 158
Warginai significance level = .0005
Notes; See Table 1.1.
ai = -22.5513
(1.887A)
a2 = -.5220
(.5083)
X In (.8357.758) = 15.2862
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consumption expenditure on nondurables and services in constant i'982
dollars, CJovemment expenditure (G^) is measured by per capita government
expenditure (federal, state, and local) on goods and services in constant
1982 dollars. Government debt is measured by per capita total
marketable interest-bearing public debt in constant 1982 dollars. Real
interest rates (r.) were computed following the formula in (11), where is
measured by the three-month return on Treasury bill yields and n is
t
measured using GNP deflator. All the data were obtained from the Citibase
data file.
I •
First, the sample period 1947,1 - 1979,IV was used to estimate the
system (17) and (18), and the likelihood ratio statistics were computed.
The period 1947,1 - 1979,IV yields a total of 132 quarterly observations.
One observation, however, is used to compute inflation (n ), and another to
compute differences * Also, m number of observations are
lost for the lags in estimation. Therefore, T = 132 - 2 - m = 130 - m.
Similary, for the period 1947,1 - 1987,1, T = 161 - 2 - m = 159 - ra.
As shown in Table 1.1, when the the lag length was taken m = 1, the value
of the log-likelihood ratio statistic is -2 ln(L^/L^) =T (InV^ -InV ) = 129
- tin(-..•37-4-) -ln(.3Dl)] = 4.5637, - with marginal-significance*-level"". 1021
(Table 1.1). The test statistic is less than the 10 percent critical value
2of the X (2) distribution 4.61, hence the hypothesis is not rejected at
uhis , conventional level of significance, even though the evidence is not
overwheljning. With the lag length m = 2, the value of the likelihood
ratio statistic is 13.5390 and the marginal significance level is .0352 for
the period 1947 - 1S79 (Table 2.1).
V.^en the sample period is extended to include the Reagan administration
period up to 198/ (1947,1 - 1987,1), the lag length m= 1 yields the value
of the likelihood ratio .statistic 15.2862, with marginal significance level
13
\.0005 (Table 1.2) . The test statistic is far above the 1 percent critical
2
value of the X (2) distribution 9.21, hence the hyiwthesis is firmly
rejected even at the 0.1 percentage level. With m=2 for the extended
period 1947,1 - 1987,1, the marginal significance level is .0035 ( Table 2.2
), hence the hj^thesis is again rejected at any conventional level of
significance.
From the estimated coefficients for the period 1947 - 1979 with m=l,
= -.0802, a^ = -21.8101, a.^ - -.9867, it follows that the point
estimate for the substitutability of government spending for private
consumption , S, is 0.0453 (5 = .0311 when m=2). This implies the
government expenditure substitutes very little for private consumption.
This is not surprising because the government expenditure G includes
federal expenditures that are generally thought to be a poor substitute for
private consumption. This finding is in siccord with Kormendi (1983) and
Aschauer (1985), who also found that government spending substitutes poorly
for private consumption in utility, but disagrees with Feldstein (1982), who
found a large crowding out of private consumption expenditure. Tne point
estimate for the risk-aversion parameter y is -21.7968 ( y - -29.9219 when
m=2).
If the model was firmly rejected for both sample periods, it would be
very hard to identify what features or assumptions of the model were
contradicted by the data. This is because the restrictions of the model
reflect such assumptions as the specification of the preference (time-
additive CRPA type), the specification of the distribution (the covariance
stationary log normal distribution), and the auxiliary equazional
assumptions as well as implications of the Ricardian equivalence hj-pothesis.
Any of these factors could be the source of t.he rejection of the model.
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Because the model was not rejected for the period up to 1979, however, it is
implied that the Ricardian equivalence hypothesis reflected in the model
appears to mimic the real data fairly well, at least until 1979.
III. Data Analysis based on a VAR representation.
What are the implications of these empirical results and what caused
rejection of the model in the extended period up to 1987 ? An immediate
implication would be that some changes may have occurred in the coefficients
of the VAR system (17) when the sample period was extended from 1979 to
1987. The VAR coefficients, in general, are difficult to give meaningful
economic interpretations. Instead, equivalent information is preserved in
the moving average coefficients, which are easier to interpret. This leads
to the so-called VAR analysis of the data pioneer^ by Sims (1980) [For a
brief discussion of the innovation accounting that provides the basis for
the VAR analysis in this section, see Appendix B] Recently, some
economists (e.g., Barro, 1980, Plosser, 1982, and Hirschhom, 1984) have
_tended..to analyze, the equivalence hj-pothesis in tenns^of the effects-of the
shocks (or unanticipated changes) in the government debt. It would be
interesting to apply the innovation accounting method to the data and to
compare the outcome with that of previous works.
Before getting into the data analysis based on a VAR, a Chow test of each
equation in (17) is implemented as a preliminary step to identify which
equations of the four-variable (tc, Tg, vb, r) system are mainly responsible
for the change in the test result of section II.® In Table 3, splitting
the sample at 19S0 shows that si^ificant differences between the two parts
of the sample are associated with the equations for interest rates and
15
Table 3. Sample Split Test
(1947-1979) vs. (1980-1987)
Equation F Statistics
(a) With 1 lag
vc F(5,148) = 1.4765
vg = 2.5998
vb = 1.2720
r = 4.0928
(b) With 2 lags
F(9,139) = 1.4974
= 2.2861
vb = 1.0525
r = 2.2157
note: see (11) for notations.
Also see footnote 8.
Significance level
.2009
.0276
.2790
.0016
.1545
.0201
.4019
.0244
Table 4. Four Variable Innovation Accounting :
Percentage of 24 quarter Forecast Error Variance 3L\-plained in each Period
_ . . /"•"(1947 to 1987V"
Variables
Ex-plained Std.Error
By Innovations in
" s T TC vb
vg .02/.02 72/85 15/ 5 9/ 6 4/ 3
T .02/.02 1/ 2 73/84 22/11 4/ 3
TC .01/.01 5/ 6 9/ 9 82/81 3/ 4
rb .02/.02 5/ 6 4/14 8/ 7 82/73
^note: Std.-rror re^rts forecast standard error for the variable e.\-plairi.
"*nen saii.pling error in the estimated coefficients is ignored.
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government expenditures. In the context of the equivalence hypothesis, the
change in interest rate-behavior is.more important.
If the market is efficient and economic agents are rational, so that they
anticipate the future tax liabilities associated with government debt, it is
expected that past information on debt should have little, if any,
predictive power for current interest rates and the growth in consumption.
The restriction (16) of the model also implies that, once the growth in
government expenditure and the interest rates are accounted for, the
information on government debt should be of no help in predicting the growth
in consumption (or, once it is adjusted for the growth in government
spending and consumption, government debt should not help predict real
interest rates). Plosser (1982), in particular, argued that surprise
increases in government debt should not drive interest rates up based on the
assumption of rational expectations and market efficiency.
As reported in error decomposition based on the four variable innovation
accounting with four lags [Table 4], innovations in debt explain only 3 and
4 percent of forecast error variance in the growth in consumption, and 4 and
3 percent of forecast error variance in real interest rates in 24 quarters
in - the first"' (1947-1979) and"''second""'(1947-1987) s^ple periods,
i espec'^.ivelj. This implies that the change in debt does not ha\'e any
significant predictive power for interest rates and the growth in
consumption in either period. This result seems to be fairly robust to
changes in ordering of the variables in the system. .
Further investigation of a possible difference in impulse responses in two
periods is illustrated in Figure 1 by the impulse responses to shocks in
debt for two sample periods: 1947-1979 and 1947-1987. It indicates that,
for a given change in government debt, the public tends to consume more, and
16
a positive response of private consumption tends to be more persistent than
before. Government expenditures tend to recover faster than before. In
contrast» real interest rates tend to move downward even further in response
to shocks in government debt.
It remains an open question why real interest rates respond negatively to
the shocks in debt; this does not seem to nicely fit the conventional view
or the Ricardian equivalence view, although only a small fraction of real
interest rates is explained by debt. Hiis finding, however, agrees with
Evans (1985, 1987), who found that there is no statistically significant
positive association between interest rates and budget deficits and instead
found that several associations are significantly negative. This also is
consistent with Plosser's finding (1982) that surprise increases (or
innovations) in government debt do not lead to upward movements in real
interest rates.
In recent years real interest rates have been relatively high, and it was
suspected that this was partly due to a higher level of government debt
issue. The preceding discussion, however, shows that innovations in debt
may not be an important source of recent high interest rates. The responses
expenditure are plotted in figure 2. In Figure 2,
is noted, however, that interest rates responded positively to the shocks
in government spending during the first six quarters. For the extended
period up to 198/, interest rates responded more strongly to the government
spending shocks. In other words, interest rates seem to respond positively
to shocks in government spending rather than to shocks in debt [see Plosser
(198^) for similar results]. In short, government debt does not seem to
ha\e any significant predictive power for interest rates and the grovrth in
consumption in either period and, in response *^o a given change in debL, the
negative effect on real interest rates seems to be even.stronger in recent
17
years. These are, as a first approximation, not at variance with the"
in^lications of the equivalence hypothesis. It is still not clear from
this analysis what really causes the strong rejection of the model for
recent years.
IV. Summary and Concluding Remarks
This paper has investigated v^ether the Ricardian equivalence hypothesis
holds for the postwar U.S. data in a general equilibrium framework. A
nonlinear-quadratic, intertemporal framework was employed to incorporate
time-varying interest rates into the model. The implications were
summarized by the restrictions on a linear system of the variables, VAR
coefficients, under certain assumptions. The restriction v;as not rejected
for the sample period 1947,1 through 1979,IV; it was, however, rejected when
the sample period was extended up to 1987,1.
An attempt was made to explore implications of the rejection through data
analysis based on a VAR approach, even though the cause of rejection could
not be fully ascertained because of the complexity of the h>-pothesis. The
evidence seems to-indicate a-possible change-in the-behavior of-- interest
rates. Whether this signals the shift in the regime is not clear due to
limitations of , the analysis. The data analysis based on a VAR does not
indicate ' any strong violation of the equivalence hypothesis. From the.
methodological point of view, this work illustrates a close link between a
nonlinear-quadratic structural model and a linear VAR representation of the
data under certain circumstances.
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Appendix A (data) •:
g : per capita government expenditure (federal, state and local) on goods
and services in constant (1982) dollars
i : three month Treasury bill rates
b : per capita total marketable interest-bearing public debt in constant
(1982) dollars.
c^ : per capita personal consumption expenditure on nondurables and
services in constant (1982) dollars
p^ : GNP deflator.
source : Citibase data file.
Appendix B. Innovation accounting.
From the moving average representation of in (12), = D{L) u^^ + d^,
the D. .(s), the i,j th component of D(s), represents the djTiamic response of
each endogenous variable Y. after s periods to an initial shock in Y..
1 J
..Although u^^ is serially uncorrelated by the construction,--the- components
of u^^ may be contemporaneously correlated so that the interpretation of
D(s) may be misleading. Therefore, an orthogonalizing transformation to u..
I u
is done as follows.
" -1 ® -1"V.- D(s)G Gu- +d-=I D(s)G v;_^
s=0 ® ^ s=0 ^
where var(u ) = V, = G'G, and var(w ) r var(G u ) = I.
V.'nen G is taken to be a lower triangular matrix, the coefficients of H(s
19
represent responses to shocks (or innovations) in particular variables.
The variance of each element in can be unambiguously allocated to
sources in elements of w because w is now serially and contemporaneously
uncorrelated. The orthogonalization provides ? H(s).^ , which is the
s=0
component of the error variance in the T+1 step ahead forecast of Y^ that
is accounted for by the innovations in Y..
J
Because a vector autoregressive representation of Y^ is already derived
in (17), the moving average representation of Y is thought to be obtained
from the VAR representation in (17). One possible problem would be the
interpretation of the innovation in Y , because Y includes the differenced
variables such as vc^, vg^, vb^. It is noted, however, that the
innovations in these variables are, for example,
f-it - = ^it - Vi' - - Vi'
= '^it - ^ •
That is, the innovation in vb amounts to the innovation in b , hence it can
have the usual interpretations.
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Footnotes
1. For example, Miller and Upton (1974), Kochin (1974), Tanner (1979),
Plosser (1982), Kormendi (1983), Evans (1985, 1987), and Aschauer (1985).
2. For example, to derive a testable hypothesis of the implications of the
Ricardian equivalence hypothesis, Aschauer (1985) assumes a quadratic
preference and a constant interest rate.
3. See Sargent ajid Wallace (1981), Sargent (1982), Darby (1984) and
MaCallum (1984). The sample period 1980 - 1987 alone does not seem to be
long enough to be treatad as a separate sample period. Therefore, I
compared the period 1947 - 1979 with the period 1947 - 1987.
4. Tne assumption of a covariance stationary process of vg ,
vb^, ' seems to me a reasonable one. It is a common practice in time
series statistics to difference a seemingly nonstationary process (i.e.,
with no fixed mean) to produce (hopefully) a stationary process (for
example, see Box ^d Jenkins, 1976). For an interesting recent discussion
of a differencing versus a detrending of the economic variables, see Nelson
and Plosser (1982). , A logarithmic transformation of the data helps to
stabilize the variations (i.e., to reduce heteroscedasticity) that tend to
increase with the level of the data. Also, a Gaussian process that is
covariance stationary, which is Eissumed for in this paper, will be
(strictly) stationary because its distribution is determined by its first
two moments. Even though differencing of series c^ and g^ was dictated by
the model to derive a closed form restriction, it may be unnecessary to
difference all the series simultaneously when considering several
nonstationary series jointly because it may result in more complications in
model fitting (see Tiao and Box, 1981, p. 804).
5. For example, using the notation that will be introduced later in
equation (17),
^it-i ^ ^2'^' "St-i ^ ^ Vi
" nt-l =C2^(L) . C23 (L) (L)'
where (L), i =l,2, j=l,2,3,4, is a matrix polj-nomial in the lag operator
6. More precisely, stationary process , which has a moving average
representation in (12), Y^ = B(L) u,^ + n_, also has a vector autoregressive
(VAR) representation (17)\7^en it is''invertible (i.e., all the zeros of the
determinantal polynomials of moving average representation coefficients
B(L) are outside the unit circle).
'• To implement the FIML estimation procedure more efficiently, first the
estimates from the OLS were used as the starting values for the unrestricted
model estimation. Second, for the restricted model estimation, the
estimates from the unrestricted model were used again as the starting
values, and various other starting \'alues also were tried for the starting
values, including ja, a^, and a^i to ensure the global optimization point-s.
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8. It can be shown that (RRSS-URSSl/k is distributed as -r
URSS/(n^+n2-2k)
F(k,n.+n2-2k), where URSS {unrestricted residual sum of squares) is-obtained
by aoding the residual sum of squares for each equations corresponding to
each sample period which has d.f. n +n2-2k. RRSS(restricted residual sura
of squares) is obtained by estimating a single equation over the whole
sample ^riod which has d.f. n^+n2-k, where n- and n^ are the numbers of
observations in the first and the second sample period, respectively, and k
is the number of coefficients.
With one lag, k=5, n =129 (1947,4-1979,4), n =29 (1980,1-1987,1), hence
ni+n2-2k=148. With two lags, k=9, n-=128 (1958,1-1979,4), n«=29, hence
ni+n2-2k=139 in table 3. ^
9. There have been several attempts to reconcile this finding with the
Ricardian regime. For example, Hirschhom (1984) provides a rational
expectations model with limited information that shows that a positive
correlation between unanticipated government debt ajid output does not imply
that government bonds are net wealth. Barro (1980) also found that the
unanticipated part of government debt affected output.
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